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Physiology and political
beliefs: A response to Knoll,
O’Daniel, and Cusato
Johnathan C. Peterson, Kevin B. Smith and John R. Hibbing

Abstract
In a recent paper in this journal, Knoll et al. question three studies from our laboratory. In this response to that paper,
we address deficiencies in their “reproduction.” Notably, we demonstrate that their data provide little evidence of a
negativity bias among research subjects, suggesting a failure not only to reproduce findings from our earlier studies, but
also a failure to find a widely acknowledged universal human physiological response trait. This situation raises a number
of questions regarding the data on which their analyses are based. We explore these questions below and speculate that
Knoll et al.’s data collection procedures may compromise their ability to speak to the external validity of earlier studies.
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Introduction
A recent Research & Politics article by Knoll et al. (2015)
raises questions about the generalizability of findings
contained in three articles coming out of our laboratory
(Dodd et al., 2012; Oxley et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2011).
We welcome Knoll et al.’s interest and efforts and readily
acknowledge that our previous studies, like all research,
could have “gotten it wrong.” The scientific process works
best when numerous research teams address a selected
topic in order that results can be verified, challenged,
extended, or modified. This process is greatly aided when
those teams allow open access to their data, and we are
happy to report that Knoll et al. responded promptly and
professionally to our request for theirs. However, we are
unconvinced that Knoll et al.’s “reproduction” study provides grounds for questioning the findings we reported
earlier. In this comment, we first discuss negativity bias in
general, then Knoll et al.’s specific results, and finally the
likely reasons for their null findings.

Negativity bias
Negativity bias refers to the well-established and widely
accepted empirical finding that people on average are significantly more sensitive, attentive, and responsive to negative than to positive arousing stimuli. Evidence for this bias

appears in a variety of cultural contexts and in the wake of
an impressive range of research designs (for a review, see
Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994). Further, negativity bias
brings with it an obvious and compelling evolutionary
logic: ignore a positive stimulus and you may not eat,
ignore a negative stimulus and you may get eaten—or eat
something that could do you harm.
Even as negativity bias appears to be something of a
human universal, individual-level variation in it is known
to exist and many hypotheses regarding the correlates of
this variation have been offered and tested. The relevant
hypothesis here is that heightened negativity bias is positively correlated with conservative political beliefs.
Numerous studies along these lines have been published.
For example, compared to liberals, conservatives weight
negative information more heavily (Shook and Fazio,
2009), remember negative stimuli more readily (Mills
et al., 2016), attend to negative stimuli more intently
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(Castelli and Carraro, 2011), report greater disgust sensitivity (Inbar et al., 2009), are more likely to feel threatened
(Bonanno and Jost, 2006), have greater grey matter density
in their amygdalas, an area of the brain often associated
with emotional responses to negative events (Kanai et al.,
2011), and have greater amygdalic activation in response to
risk (Schreiber et al., 2013).
Our three studies were intended to contribute to this
growing literature on the correlation between negativity bias
and political preferences by focusing on a rudimentary
physiological rather than cognitive or neural response.
Using standard measures of sympathetic nervous system
response such as electrodermal activity (EDA; sometimes
called skin conductance) we found that individuals with
conservative beliefs on particular issues, especially those
targeted at either sexual or “protective” behaviors, tend to
have greater spikes in their EDA when presented with negative stimuli. Though our physiological results seem perfectly consistent with the large and growing literature on the
deeper differences of liberals and conservatives, Knoll et al.
were unable to reproduce them in their student sample.

Knoll et al.’s results
Aspects of Knoll et al.’s research design are similar to ours.
The appropriate physiological sensors for measuring EDA
were attached before 69 research participants were shown
numerous images seriatim. Some of these images were
threatening such as a criminal holding a gun; some were
disgusting such as a toilet covered in vomit and fecal matter; some were positive such as a smiling baby; and some
were neutral such as a plain piece of toast.
Given the widely acknowledged existence of a negativity bias, a basic validity check on data collection procedures in this research design is examining whether, as
expected, negative images (threatening and disgusting
images), elicit a significantly greater EDA response than
the neutral or positive images. Knoll et al. do not report
such a validity check. When we examine their data, we find
no statistically significant difference in EDA response for
non-threatening images and either threatening (t(63)=0.63,
p=0.53) or disgusting images (t(62)=0.69, p=0.49). In
short, their data suggest that on average people are not
more responsive to negative than to non-negative stimuli.
This finding potentially has broad-reaching implications
because it challenges the longstanding empirical record that
a negativity bias is a universal human trait. For reasons that
are not entirely clear, Knoll et al. skip over this result in
order to analyze the correlation of political preferences
with the degree of negativity bias where, in contrast to our
results, they do indeed fail to find a significant relationship
between degree of negativity bias and political beliefs.
One explanation for their null finding may indeed be that
the results we reported in earlier studies do not replicate,
that is, the relationships we reported are artifacts of small
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samples, chance, failure to properly account for all causes of
EDA fluctuations, some unknown contamination in our subject pool, or some other reason. Like all scientists we accept
that identifying robust relationships requires replication and
we must be willing to accept the null if results from our
laboratory do not “travel.” An alternate explanation, however, is that their data are not reliable enough to address this
important question of external validity. Given the absence of
an overall negativity bias in their data—that is, their failure
to find a relationship with high levels of external validity—
it is obviously going to be difficult to demonstrate that individual-level variation in that (non-existent) negativity bias
correlates with variation in anything else, including political
attitudes. Instead of focusing on our three studies on the
association of negativity bias and political preferences,
Knoll et al. seem positioned to fry a much bigger fish;
namely the existence of negativity bias in the first place.
Such a bold claim, however, would require data and procedures that were up to the challenge, and on this point we fear
that Knoll et al.’s results may come up short.

Knoll et al.’s procedures
Knoll et al. explicitly state that their study is an attempted
“reproduction” of our research rather than an attempted “replication.” This caveat is important as their question wording,
photographic stimuli, and sample composition differ significantly from our studies. As they put it, their methods are “an
attempt to ‘reproduce’ the same findings in a novel context
with slightly varying conditions to determine the extent of
their generalizability” (Knoll et al., 2015: 3). They are absolutely correct that making slight deviations in research protocols is vital for assessing the convergent validity of established
findings; however, we view their deviations as considerable
in magnitude. We will limit our discussion to two major
departures—physiological data collection procedures and
stimulus selection—that raise substantive questions about
comparing their results to those from our studies.
The data for Dodd et al. (2012), Oxley et al. (2008), and
Smith et al. (2011) came from one of two data collection
periods in the summers of 2007 and 2008. Each sample of
roughly 50 non-student participants was drawn from a
larger representative sample of 200 people, and only nine
individuals participated in both the 2007 and 2008 data collection periods. Each research participant was isolated in a
light and temperature controlled laboratory for stimulus
presentation (on a computer screen right in front of them)
and physiological recording. The idea was to exercise as
much control as possible over the environment, thereby
maximizing participant attention to the presented stimulus
rather than environmental distractions.
Knoll et al.’s approach was significantly different. In their
study, subjects did not view stimuli in isolation, nor did they
view stimuli on a computer screen immediately in front of
them. In their study, participants came in groups of 15–20,
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were seated at individual computer stations, and were hooked
up to the physiological data acquisition equipment. Their
stimulus presentation took place not on an individual computer but on a single overhead projection viewed by the
entire group in the large room, and there was no indication
that this room was light and temperature controlled (important because human physiology responds to ambient light
and temperature). These procedures raise concerns about
potential confounds—for example, participants may have
been influenced by other people in the room or by variations
in the distance from the screen rather than by a stimulus presented in isolation. The large number of potential distractions
may explain why, in contrast to existing research, Knoll et al.
failed to find a significant overall negativity bias in their
respondents. In any event, collecting physiological data from
large groups of people at the same time is not standard practice in psychophysiological research.
If we set aside concerns that these procedures may introduce noise and/or diminished effects into the data collected,
the lack of negativity bias in Knoll et al.’s findings could
constitute an interesting contribution to the broader literature on physiology and negativity bias. Previous examinations of negativity bias occur with participants who are
isolated from other participants. Is it possible that when
people are in groups a noticeable reduction in negativity
bias occurs? This possibility is consistent with Knoll et al.’s
findings and, if correct, would be an interesting and even
valuable addition to our current understanding of the social
nature of the human species. Nonetheless, given the deviations from standard procedure, it is impossible to tell if the
inability to reproduce the findings from our laboratory is
due to a failure of external validity in our studies or a failure
of internal validity in Knoll et al.’s studies.
Stimulus choice is another concern. Smith et al. specifically chose three images that captured what is labeled as
“core or contamination disgust” (Smith et al., 2011: 3).
These images were of a man eating a handful of worms, an
emaciated but alive body, and excrement floating in a toilet.
These images were chosen because they captured a specific
concept. In their reproduction of this study, Knoll et al. used
images that likely do not tap the same target concept of core
or contamination disgust. For example, images of a bloody
wound and a bloodied face (two of the images employed by
Knoll et al.) arguably are more likely to provoke a threat (or
at least animal reminder disgust) rather than a core disgust
response—indeed, they are highly similar to images Knoll
et al. used to capture physiological responses to threat
(r=0.98, p<0.001). Knoll et al. appear to be measuring different concepts than the Smith et al. study, which would certainly help to explain the lack of similarity in the results.

should note. In particular, we encourage the use of nonstudent samples with participants isolated in light and
temperature controlled rooms, who are exposed to stimuli
in exactly the same way (e.g. stimulus presentation is
always from the same distance). Furthermore, as a validity check we encourage a rigorous process of stimulus
selection—that is, pretesting stimuli—to ensure selected
stimuli are conceptually appropriate. Finally, we also
encourage basic validity checks on physiological data
collected during the course of these investigations. For
example, it is fairly straightforward to check for something like negativity bias by checking mean differences
between negative versus neutral or positive stimuli. If
that test confirms negativity bias—a general human
trait—it provides prima facie evidence that the data are
accurately tapping into well understood physiological
responses.
We are in complete agreement with Knoll et al.’s call
for more replication and reproduction. Pushing this line
of research forward is vitally important, as there is still
much work to do in order to understand the degree to
which these findings hold across multiple contexts. While
confident in the internal validity of our studies, we are
well aware that external validity is an issue that can only
be addressed by replication, preferably in other laboratories. Our studies used two distinct adult samples with
relatively small N’s from a politically diverse but geographically compact area. Do our findings travel beyond
that? The only honest answer is that we do not know and
cannot know until other laboratories have weighed in.
The nature of data collection in the area of physiology
sometimes precludes large-N studies for reasons as varied as resource limitations and the time intensive nature
of the data collection process. This limitation opens the
door for the vagaries of small-N studies to produce nongeneralizable results. For that reason, we would like to
echo Knoll et al.’s call for further research and thank
them for taking the first steps in that direction. However,
in this case, their failure to detect even a general negativity bias, probably due to notable departures from standard research practices for collecting physiological data,
compromises their ability to speak directly to the external
validity of our findings.

Conclusion
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